Foreign direct investment and international business cycle comovement by Jansen, W. Jos & Stokman, Ad C.J.
WORKING PAPER SERIES






by W. Jos Jansen 
and Ad C.J. StokmanIn 2004 all 
publications 
will carry 











by W. Jos Jansen
2
and Ad C.J. Stokman
3
1   We would like to thank Henrik Braconier,Maria Demertzis,Peter van Els,Paolo Guarda,Jerôme Henry,Lex Hoogduin,Dan Knudsen,Franz
Palm,Robert Sonora,Job Swank,Karl-Heinz Tödter,Reinhilde Veugelers and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on previous
drafts,and Martin Admiraal for able research assistance.Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official
positions of De Nederlandsche Bank.
2   Corresponding author.Monetary and Economic Policy Department,De Nederlandsche Bank,P.O.Box 98,1000 AB Amsterdam,
The Netherlands;e-mail:w.j.jansen@dnb.nl;phone:00-31-20-5245727;fax 31-20-5242506.
3   Research Department,De Nederlandsche Bank.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=601021.© European Central Bank, 2004
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-
commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB











2 Foreign direct investment as a channel for
international transmission of disturbances 8
3 Some facts on FDI and its significance
for the host economies 10
4 FDI relations and international business
cycle linkages 12
5 The role of international trade 16
6 Lagged spillovers 18
7 Summary and conclusions 19
22
References 29
European Central Bank working paper series 32
Figures and TablesAbstract
This paper investigates the relationship between bilateral FDI positions and cross-country business
cycle correlations in the period 1982–2001. We find that countries that have comparatively intensive
FDI relations also have more synchronized business cycles during 1995–2001. Before 1995, we also
find a positive association between FDI linkages and output comovement, but this may partly reflect
the effects of trade relations. Moreover, more intensive FDI links are also associated with a greater
vulnerability to lagged output spillovers from abroad, whereas trade links are not. Policy implications
of our research are (1) that there is an underlying tendency for business cycles to exhibit greater
comovement in the future, and (2) that policy makers need to incorporate the FDI linkage among
economies in their models and analytical framework for policy analysis.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, business cycle synchronization, international linkages, spillovers
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JEL classification: E32, F21, J23, J31Non-technical summary
Business cycle behavior has been relatively synchronized since the mid-nineties. In 2001, the
dispersion of economic growth rates across the industrialized economies even fell to its lowest level in
over 30 years, as the global economy experienced a downturn that was unusually wide-spread across
countries. Broadly speaking, the observed degree of output comovement reflects both the nature of the
shocks that have occurred and the degree of economic interdependence. Output developments will be
more correlated if common shocks happen to be predominant, while they will be more asymmetric if
idiosyncratic shocks are most important. Because of economic relations among economies, country-
specific shocks may get transmitted to other countries, enhancing output comovement indirectly.
International economic interdependence has increased along three dimensions. The first is
international trade in goods and services, which is the ‘traditional’ channel through which economies
may affect each other. The second type of link consists of international trade in financial assets, such
as equity and bonds, and cross-border credit relations. Cross-border holdings of portfolio assets have
mushroomed in recent years. The third dimension of interdependence is the internationalization of
production through foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign direct investment has grown at rates far
beyond those of international trade or output since the late 1980s. Especially in the second half of the
1990s, firms were exceptionally active in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The outstanding
global stock of FDI more than doubled from 8.3% of world GDP in 1990 to 17.5% in 2000. At
present, about 11% of world output is produced by foreign-controlled firms.
This paper examines to what extent the rapid expansion of FDI and the internationalization of
production can be related to the phenomenon of more synchronized business cycles. Both larger
inward and outward investment positions may make the domestic economy more susceptible to
economic disturbances abroad.
Using data on bilateral FDI positions our key empirical question is: Do countries that have
comparatively intensive FDI ties also exhibit a relatively large degree of business cycle comovement?
We analyze the experience in the years 1982–2001 of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the
UK and the US, looking at the bilateral linkages of these six countries among themselves and with six
other countries (Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland), employing five measures
of international output comovement. In addition, we investigate the ability of international trade
patterns to explain business cycle linkages.
Taking into account both FDI relations and foreign trade relations, we conclude that before 1995 there
is no strong evidence in favor of an independent role of FDI in explaining cross-country business cycle
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October 2004patterns. Although the degree of output comovement tends to be higher for economies that have
relatively intensive investment relations, we find the same to be true for international trade relations.
We thus find strong and robust evidence for a link between bilateral economic relationships and
bilateral business cycle correlations, but multicollinearity problems prevent a precise assessment of the
respective contributions of trade and FDI. Trade patterns tend to explain the pattern of output
comovement better than FDI linkages in the years immediately following German reunification and
the collapse of the Japanese asset market bubble (1990–1994). The strong growth of FDI since 1995
appears to have changed this picture. FDI linkages are much better able to explain the pattern of
international business cycle linkages than foreign trade relations in the years 1995–2001. Regarding
the vulnerability to foreign output spillovers that occur with a lag, we find that FDI exposures are
relevant, but international trade relations are not. In contrast to the case of contemporaneous linkages,
this result is also obtained for the complete sample, not just the most recent period.
The empirical results of this paper are supportive evidence for the view that apart from the foreign
trade channel, FDI now constitutes a separate channel through which economies may affect each other
in an economically significant fashion. Moreover, foreign disturbances may influence the domestic
economy for a longer time-span when relayed through the FDI channel than through the trade channel,
which mainly operates contemporaneously.
Our research has two policy implications. The first one is that the trend towards greater economic
interdependence through FDI implies an underlying tendency for business cycles to display a more
synchronized behavior than in the past. This is not to say that we will actually observe greater output
comovement in the future all the time, however. As the experience of the 1990s teaches, the effects of
large asymmetric shocks may overshadow the upward influence on account of increasing
interdependence. The second lesson for policy makers is that FDI appears to have become an
important channel for the international transmission of disturbances. This aspect of global linkages
should be incorporated into the macroeconomic models that are used for making forecasts, evaluating
scenarios and conducting policy analyses by national policy makers and international organizations,
such as the IMF and the OECD. Up until now, international trade and financial asset prices serve as
the main linkages among individual economies in these models. Finding out how the FDI channel
exactly operates therefore constitutes an interesting and challenging research agenda.
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 401
October 20041. Introduction
Business cycle behavior has been relatively synchronized since the mid-nineties. In 2001, the
dispersion of economic growth rates across the industrialized economies even fell to its lowest level in
over 30 years, as the global economy experienced a downturn that was unusually wide-spread across
countries. Broadly speaking, the observed degree of output comovement reflects both the nature of the
shocks that have occurred and the degree of economic interdependence. Output developments will be
more correlated if common shocks happen to be predominant, while they will be more asymmetric if
idiosyncratic shocks are most important.
1 Because of economic relations among economies, country-
specific shocks may get transmitted to other countries, enhancing output comovement indirectly. The
higher degree of output comovement in recent years has partly been driven by common shocks, such
as large changes in crude oil prices, the rise and fall of the information technology boom and
restrictive monetary policies (Peersman 2002). However, it is widely felt that common shocks are not
the whole story, raising the question to what extent deeper economic linkages, and what kind of
linkages, may have contributed to the more synchronized nature of economic fluctuations.
The rise in international economic interdependence has occurred along three dimensions. The first is
international trade in goods and services, which is the ‘traditional’ channel through which economies
may affect each other. Although imports and exports as a share of GDP have in general increased,
there has been no marked across-the board acceleration of this trend recently. It is therefore unlikely
that deeper trade interdependencies have contributed significantly to the recent rise in output
correlations. The second type of link is provided by international trade in financial assets, such as
equity and bonds, and cross-border credit relations. Cross-border holdings of portfolio assets have
mushroomed in recent years. For example, foreign holdings of US long-term securities amounted to
42% of US GDP in March 2000, having tripled in less than 2½ years (Griever, Lee and Warnock
2001). Correlations between stock markets of the major countries have greatly increased over the last
twenty years, with the exception of Japan (Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst 2001, Berben and Jansen
2002). Financial markets have thus gained importance as a channel for the international transmission
of shocks. The third dimension of interdependence is the internationalization of production through
foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign direct investment has grown at rates far beyond those of
international trade or output since the late 1980s. Especially in the second half of the 1990s, firms
were exceptionally active in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The outstanding global
stock of FDI more than doubled in ten years time from 8.3% of world GDP in 1990 to 17.5% in 2000
(UNCTAD 2002). At present, about 11% of world output is produced by foreign affiliates (UNCTAD
                                                          
1 For example, international output correlations were low in the first half of the 1990s, because the picture was
dominated by two unusually large country-specific shocks, namely German reunification and the collapse of the
stock market and real estate bubbles in Japan (IMF 2002).
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in cross-country business cycle comovement.
The empirical literature on the effects of FDI is often based on firm-level data and mainly deals with
supply-side effects on host economies in the longer run, focusing on the transfer of technology,
management techniques and business models.
2 This paper focuses on another aspect of FDI, namely
the possible role FDI may play in the transmisssion of economic shocks across borders. Using
aggregate data, we examine to what extent the rapid expansion of FDI and the internationalization of
production can be related to the phenomenon of more synchronized business cycles. Our basic
empirical question is: Do countries that have comparatively intensive FDI ties tend to have more
synchronous business cycles? To our knowledge we are the first to investigate this issue. To preview
the results, we find that before 1995 there is no strong evidence in favor of an independent role of FDI
(next to foreign trade) in explaining cross-country business cycle correlation patterns. But after 1995,
FDI linkages are much better able to explain the pattern of international business cycle linkages than
foreign trade relations. Moreover, FDI is associated with the vulnerability to foreign output spillovers
that occur with a lag, but international trade is not. This result holds for the complete sample as well as
the more recent years.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the channels through
which FDI may transmit disturbances across borders. Section 3 offers a short description of the main
trends in FDI positions over the past 20 years and their geographical composition in a number of
industrialized countries. It also presents some figures on the significance of foreign affiliates for host-
economy output and employment. Section 4 investigates whether cross-country variation in (bilateral)
output comovement measures bears a relation to cross-country variation in (bilateral) foreign direct
investment positions. Section 5 looks into the role of international trade in this respect. Section 6
analyzes output spillovers that occur with a lag. Section 7 summarizes our main findings and draws
some policy conclusions.
2. Foreign direct investment as a channel for international transmission of disturbances
Foreign direct investments are investments made by a resident of one economy (source economy) with
the objective of establishing a lasting interest in a company located in another economy (host
                                                          
2 See Ewe-Ghee Lim (2001) for an overview. There is solid empirical evidence that positive spillover effects on
economic activity exist, although opinions vary on the exact magnitude (Blomström, Globerman and Kokko
2000). For example, Barrell and Pain (1997) present evidence that technology transfers from foreign-owned
firms has stimulated the rate of technical progress in the UK and Germany. Spillover effects may also go from
affiliate to parent company if acquisition of operational efficiency is the main reason of the transaction
(McGuckin and Nguyen 1995). Harris and Robinson (2002) found that the British plants selected by foreign
multinational companies performed above-average compared to other manufacturing firms.
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significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the foreign firm. In
statistics, ownership of at least ten percent of the ordinary shares or voting stock is the criterion for the
existence of a direct investment relationship. Ownership of less than ten percent is considered a
portfolio investment. FDI comprises not only mergers and takeovers/acquisitions (brownfield
investments) and new investments (greenfield investments), but also reinvested earnings  and loans
and similar capital transfers between parents and affiliates.
Industrial countries typically act both as host to FDI projects in their own country and as participant in
investment projects in other countries. A country’s inward FDI position is made up of the hosted FDI
projects, while the outward FDI position consists of the FDI projects owned abroad. Both larger
inward and outward FDI positions may make the domestic economy more sensitive to economic
disturbances abroad in the short run.
As the inward position represents imported capital, the host country always runs the risk that foreign
investors, for whatever reason, may want to withdraw their money. More generally, a deterioration of
the economic conditions in the foreign investor’s home country may weaken the financial health of the
parent company, which in turn may lead to cutbacks in employment, wages and investment in the host
countries. International rent sharing within multinational companies may be at the root of this type of
vulnerability. Within a multinational corporation, firm-specific assets are a joint input, giving
economics of scale at the company level rather than at the level of the individual plant. Global profits
may be shared (with a lag) with affiliates and their workers. Due to the trend towards
internationalization of production, domestic wages and employment may thus increasingly reflect
international factors in addition to local economic conditions; see also Blanchflower, Oswald and
Sanfey (1996). Budd and Slaughter (2000) provide evidence of cross-border profit sharing between
American and Canadian firms. Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002) found that foreign-affiliate wages
were positively related to parent profit per worker for a sample of European firms.
The macroeconomic risks related to the outward FDI position have to do with the consequences that
disturbances abroad may have for the financial position of the investing firms. Unfavorable
developments in the host countries may reduce the value of the investment projects abroad, and thus
the value of domestic firms. This reduction of net worth may lead to lower stock prices and greater
difficulties for domestic firms in securing external finance for planned domestic investment projects,
both in the capital market and with banks. Domestic investment may thus be hurt via the balance sheet
9
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3 The fall in stock prices, at home and abroad, may
adversely affect domestic consumption via wealth effects, balance sheet effects and confidence
effects.
4
In addition the type of FDI (horizontal or vertical) may be relevant. Horizontal FDI is motivated by the
desire to be close to customer markets due to high trade costs. The firm then runs similar operations at
different locations, producing and selling in the same country (or nearby countries). This type of FDI
is thus a substitute for international trade relations. Vertical FDI arises when firms want to take
advantage of international differences in factor prices. The firm then splits up the production process,
allocating the parts over different countries on the basis of cost efficiency. The firm services its
markets by exporting from a single location. Hence, this type of FDI creates trade, both of
intermediate and final goods. The FDI transmission channel outlined above applies to horizontal FDI.
In case of vertical FDI, the transmission channel becomes even stronger, because some production
decisions become directly linked across countries. If the parent company decides to cut output, output
in affiliates producing intermediate goods and parts will also be reduced. Most empirical work tends to
conclude that most real-world FDI is horizontal (Brainard 1997; Carr, Markusen and Maskus 2001).
5
As we focus on FDI relations among highly industrialized countries, this is likely to be true for our
data as well.
3. Some facts on FDI and its significance for the host economies
Stocks and flows of FDI have grown rapidly across the OECD area since the mid-1980s, with a
marked acceleration since 1995. FDI has also increased faster than international trade. The outward
FDI position of Germany and France is currently around 25% of GDP, four to five times the level of
1985. For traditional investor countries like the UK and the Netherlands, positions are much larger,
55% and 80% respectively. The outward investment position of the US increased from 5% of GDP in
1985 to 13% in 2000. As outward and inward FDI positions tend to move in tandem over time, gross
positions have grown much faster than net positions. The increase in FDI ties among the industrialized
countries can thus be characterized as a process of diversification. The Japanese experience does not
fit in with the general picture. Japanese corporations even reduced their presence abroad in the second
half of the 1990s, while Japan’s stock of inward FDI is very small (1% of GDP in 2000).
                                                          
3 See Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard
(1996) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2002) for a discussion of the link between investment and the
stock market.
4 See Boone, Giorno and Richardson (1998), Boone, Girouard and Wanner (2001), Poterba (2000) and Starr-
McCluer (2002) for estimates of the wealth effect on consumption. Otoo (1999) and Jansen and Nahuis (2003)
present evidence on the link between the stock market and consumer confidence.
5 However, this view is not going unchallenged. Hanson et al. (2001), Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002) and
Slaughter (2003) all make the point that vertical FDI is more important than is generally believed.
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geographical distribution of the stocks of inward and outward FDI for Canada, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK and the US for the years 1985 and 2000. The most intensive FDI link is that
between Canada and the US. In 1985 75% of total Canadian inward FDI originated from the US, while
in 2000 this was still 63%. In general, the US is a major source and destination of FDI. In 2000, the
UK was the largest direct investor in the US (17.6% of the US total), followed by Japan (13.5%) and
the Netherlands (12.1%). The UK, Canada and the Netherlands received the largest amounts of
American FDI. France, Germany and the Netherlands have established intensive FDI relations with
EU countries, both as investors and as hosts. The overall trend toward diversification is also visible in
the geographical distributions of the FDI positions, which have become more even over time. Finally,
shares in the inward FDI portfolio and shares in the outward FDI portfolio are positively correlated.
Inward and outward FDI move together, not only at the aggregate level, but also bilaterally. This
observation confirms that the FDI process between two countries typically involves capital flows of
comparable size in both directions, through which countries swap claims on their capital stocks.
The presence of foreign investors means that part of domestic output is produced by firms controlled
by foreigners. Comprehensive data on the share of output accounted for by foreign affiliates are
scarce. In Table 2 we have collected some data, taken from several sources, that may give an
impression of the weight of foreign-owned companies in the manufacturing sector and the total
economy in 13 host countries in 1989 and 1998–1999. Table 2 first shows the output produced by
majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFA) of US companies as a percentage of host country GDP in
12 countries.
6 In 1999, US MOFAs alone were responsible for 17% of Irish GDP, 10% of Canadian
GDP and 7% of UK GDP. In Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands their output share was around
5%. We combine this information with the share of the US in the host country’s inward FDI position,
if available, to arrive at a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the output share of all foreign affiliates
taken together.
7 Our, admittedly rough, estimates indicate that between 10 and 20% of GDP could be
accounted for by foreign-owned firms, pointing to a potentially substantial role for foreign affiliates in
the domestic economy. Because the US economy is so large, foreign affiliates still account for a
relatively small part of US GDP: 5.6% in 1999 and 6.0% in 2000 (Zeile 2002). Still, this represents a
substantial increase from the level ten years ago (4.1%). Finally, Table 2 also reports, depending on
availability, the share in employment in the manufacturing sector accounted for by foreign affiliates in
1998. These data too are suggestive of an important role of foreign firms in their host economies.
                                                          
6 US FDI in MOFAs is approximately 85% of total outward FDI.
7 We computed the estimated output share of all foreign affiliates by dividing the US MOFA output share by the
US share in inward FDI (as reported by the host country).
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In this section we investigate whether there is a positive relationship between the size of bilateral
foreign direct investment positions and the degree of business cycle comovement among countries. If
two countries have invested a lot in each other, do their output cycles tend to move in a more
synchronized way? In addition we examine whether this relationship has changed over time.
Taking a bilateral perspective, we focus on the experience in the past 20 years of Canada, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. For these countries bilateral FDI positions (both
inward and outward) that are consistently measured across time are available for a long period,
including estimates for the year 2001.
8 We will refer to these six countries as the reporting countries,
since the FDI positions are measured from their perspective. We look at the bilateral linkages of the
six reporting countries among themselves and with six other countries (Australia, Belgium, Italy,
Japan, Sweden and Switzerland). These latter six countries are selected because of their size and their
importance as an importer and exporter of FDI. Taken together, our 12 countries represent 70% of the
outstanding stock of FDI at the end of 2000. For each reporting country we thus distinguish bilateral
links with 11 countries, which we will refer to as its partner countries.
The data on the FDI positions are available on an annual basis and reflect the state at the end of the
year. We define the bilateral FDI position of country R versus country P as the sum of R’s stock of
direct investments in P and P’s stock of direct investments in R, as reported by country R (in R’s
currency). We take the sum of both the inward and the outward position as our measure of the bilateral
FDI link, as disturbances in country P may affect economic conditions in country R via both types of
exposure. For instance, an unfavorable shock in country P may reduce the value of domestic firms’
investment projects located in P, depressing their stock prices. This in turn may negatively affect
domestic consumption and investment via wealth effects, confidence effects and balance sheet effects.
Alternatively, companies in P may react to the worsening situation in their home country by reducing
their presence abroad, cutting back employment and/or reducing investment at their affiliates in
country R and other countries.
In the absence of a well-established definition of international output comovement, we distinguish five
measures of the degree of output comovement. The first measure is the correlation of the quarterly
                                                          
8 Data on bilateral FDI positions for the US, Germany and Canada are available for the years 1982–2001, for
France for 1988-2001, for the Netherlands for 1984–2001, and for 1984 and 1987–2001 for the UK. Missing
observations have been estimated on the basis of bilateral FDI flows. Sources are OECD (2002a), Banque de
France (2002), Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), Statistics Canada (2002), Sparling (2002), Borga and Yorgason
(2002) and Borga and Mataloni (2001). Recent data are also available on the websites of Statistics Canada, the
Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banque de France, De Nederlandsche Bank, the UK Office of National Statistics and
the US Department of Commerce.
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difference between actual real GDP and its trend level (estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter).
9 The
third measure is the business cycle coherence on a quarterly basis, which is based on a business cycle
dating by the IMF (IMF 2002).
10 It equals the fraction of time that two countries are in the same
business cycle phase (expansion or recession). The fourth and fifth comovement measures are the
correlation of the annual growth rates of real GDP and the correlation of the annual output gaps
respectively. The correlations derived from annual data may also pick up spillover effects that occur
with a delay of one or more quarters.
Figure 1 offers an impression of the average degree of business cycle comovement among the G7
countries (the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) in the
years 1980–2001, based on our first two measures. The graph first of all shows that the degree of
output comovement has been high by historical standards in recent years. Moreover, its behavior over
time differs from period to period. In the 1980s the average correlation of real GDP growth rates was
fairly constant, in the first half of the 1990s it substantially declined, while in recent years it sharply
increased. This non-monotonic time profile underscores the importance of time-variation in the
mixture of common and idiosyncratic shocks. Given that the time profile of FDI linkages (and other
measures of interdependence) is strictly increasing, Figure 1 makes clear that any link between FDI
and business cycle comovement must be hidden in the cross-section of countries.
11
Our estimation method has to take into account that time variation in the mix and size of disturbances
may obscure the relationship between FDI positions and output correlations. For this reason, cross-
section regressions for each reporting country are the natural estimation design. Due to the limited
number of observations (11) per country, we have pooled the cross-section regressions for the six
reporting countries into a single one.
12 To find out whether more intensive FDI linkages are associated
with a greater degree of output comovement, we estimate the following regression equation
) , ( ) , ( 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 j i FDIP D D D D D j i β α α α α α α ρ + + + + + + = (1)
                                                          
9 As a check on robustness, we also did the estimations for output gap correlations based on a trend level
estimated by the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. These results, which are very similar to those reported for the HP-
filtered data, are available from the authors upon request. Source of the data was the Quarterly National
Accounts, published by the OECD.
10 The IMF (2002) dated business cycle peaks and troughs for the level of real GDP on the basis of the Bry-
Boschan algorithm for 21 industrial countries using quarterly data for the years 1973–2000. We use this dating
of (level) recessions and expansions to calculate the coherence for each pair of countries, which is defined as the
fraction of time the two countries are in a recession or an expansion simultaneously.
11 Recent empirical evidence on increasing business cycle comovement is provided by Artis and Zhang (1999),
Luginbuhl and Koopman (2003), Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Carvalho and Harvey (2003), among others.
12 We have also estimated separate cross-section regressions for each reporting country. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
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country  i, and zero otherwise. ρ(i,j) denotes the measure of business cycle comovement between
reporting country i and partner country j (11 countries) over a certain time-span, while FDIP(i,j) is the
average strength of the corresponding FDI link. Eq. (1) assumes that the intercept differs across
countries, but that β is the same for each country. Differences in intercepts take into account fixed
differences across countries and may also correct for methodological differences between national FDI
statistics. The parameter β measures the sensitivity of output comovement to variations in the intensity
of FDI relations. We conduct diagnostic tests whether the data support the implied restriction that all
countries have the same β.
If the sample period for which we compute output comovement measures and FDI exposures happens
to be characterized by a preponderance of common shocks, all ρ(i,j) will tend to be large, which will
translate into high estimates of the intercepts α0+αi in eq. (1). By contrast, if the sample period is
dominated by idiosyncratic shocks, all ρ(i,j) will tend to be small, resulting in low estimates of α0+αi.
However, conditional on the mixture of shocks, differences in ρ(i,j) for a given country i vis-à-vis its
partners could still be explained by differences in the intensity of the bilateral economic relations. The
coefficient β can thus be interpreted as the effect of a unit increase in FDI exposure given the mixture
and size of shocks in the years over which output comovement and FDI positions have been measured.
The average vulnerability through bilateral FDI linkages – denoted by FDIP(i,j) – over a certain time-
span is calculated as follows. Since both inward and outward FDI make a country more sensitive to
outside developments, we first compute, for each year, the total FDI position (both inward and
outward) of country i vis-à-vis country j, as recorded by country i (in the currency of country i). To
calculate the vulnerability of reporting country i and partner country j that is associated with this
amount, we express it as a percentage of GDP of country i and j, respectively. Since a correlation is a
symmetric concept, we take the simple average of both vulnerability measures as our annual
observation of the exposure associated with the bilateral FDI link.
13 FDIP(i,j) is the average of the
annual observations over the time-span under consideration.
                                                          
13 Note that the same dollar amount may imply vastly different vulnerabilities because GDPs differ greatly
across countries. For example, the Dutch FDI position versus the US at the end of 2000 amounted to 35% of
Dutch GDP or 1.6% of US GDP. We use purchasing power parity exchange rates to convert partner country
GDPs into reporting country currencies. Assigning the two individual vulnerability measures the same weight in
the calculation of FDIP is supported by the data. When we included both measures in eq. (1) as separate
explanatory variables, the hypothesis of equal slope coefficients could not be rejected at the usual significance
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implies some sort of double counting of the observations relating to the links among the six reporting
countries. Although there are 66 independent observations on FDI exposures, there are only 51 unique
observations on the correlations. Observations relating to links among the six reporting countries thus
get double weight in the sum of squares, once with FDIP(i,j) according to country i’s statistics and
once with FDIP(i,j) according to country j’s statistics. Note that estimation of six separate cross-
section equations would implicitly involve the same double counting. For this reason we always report
two sets of estimation results: the first one is based on OLS (66 observations), the second one on
weighted least squares (WLS). Observations relating to links among the six reporting countries are
assigned a weight of ½, all other observations a weight of 1, so that all observations on ρ(i,j) receive
equal weight in the sum of squares. The effective number of observations in case of estimation by
WLS is 51.
14
Table 3 reports the empirical results for the complete sample period 1982–2001 and three subperiods,
1982–1989, 1990–1994 and 1995–2001. This particular split-up of the sample is based on the work by
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), who studied business cycles in the period 1973–2002 for the G7
countries. They found that the years 1990–1994 were characterized by an atypical pattern of business
cycle linkages, probably because of the aftermath of German reunification and the collapse of the
Japanese asset market bubble. Moreover, FDI grew very rapidly in the period 1995–2001.
The empirical results provide supportive evidence for a link between bilateral FDI patterns and output
comovement patterns. Contemporaneous correlations of quarterly growth rates are significantly higher
for economies that have intensive investment relations than for countries that have less intensive
investment relations. Moreover, the positive association of FDI and output comovement is more
apparent in the most recent years, as evidenced by the larger point estimate and t-statistic of the slope
coefficient β for the subperiod 1995–2001 (5.36 for OLS; 6.30 for WLS), compared to that for the
complete sample (2.83 for OLS; 4.01 for WLS). The estimate of β indicates that a difference in FDI
exposure of 1 percentage point is associated with an 0.02 percentage point higher output correlation in
recent years.
Panel 4b shows that there is also a statistically significant positive association between the intensity of
FDI relations and the correlation of output gaps for all subperiods considered. This holds for both the
                                                          
14 FDIP may possibly be endogenous. For example, FDI location decisions may partly be driven by the desire to
insure against national business cycle risks. This argument implies a negative association between output
correlations and FDI intensity. Our working hypothesis is that the association is positive, however. To the extent
risk diversification motives play a part, some downward bias may be introduced, which will tend to make it more
difficult to obtain a positive estimate that is statistically significant. Consequently, significant positive estimates
cannot be attributed to this kind of endogeneity bias.
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recent years. Measuring output comovement by business cycle coherence, we find a positive and
significant β-estimate for the complete sample (1982–2001), but for the eighties there seems to be no
connection between FDI relations and output comovement (panel 4c). Finally, the results for
correlations derived from annual data also point to a positive association of FDI exposures and
business cycle linkages (panels 4d and 4e). Lastly, parameter tests show that the pooled regression
design is appropriate, as (with one exception) the hypothesis of equal slope coefficients across
reporting countries cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels, while the hypothesis of
equal intercepts is rejected in a number of cases.
15
5. The role of international trade
The evidence presented thus far only focuses on FDI links between countries. Economies are also
linked by international trade ties, however, which is an alternative explanation of international
business cycle comovement. Moreover, it is likely that countries that invest a lot in each other will
also tend to trade a lot with each other. The countries of the European Union, or the US and Canada,
are a case in point. Investment ties and trade ties may also vastly differ, however. For example, the
share of the US in the foreign trade of the Netherlands is only 4%, whereas its share in Dutch FDI
capital is more than 20%. The fact that geographical distributions of FDI exposures and foreign trade
relations are correlated, implies that the estimates in Table 4 may partly reflect the effects of trade
relations (or economic relations in general). To shed light on this issue, this section examines the role
of bilateral trade ties in explaining output comovement patterns.
We first look into the relationship between international trade and output comovement along the same
lines as the analysis for FDI. To this end we estimate eq. (2), which is similar to eq. (1),
) , ( ) , ( 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 j i TRADE D D D D D j i γ α α α α α α ρ + + + + + + = (2)
TRADE(i,j) measures the average vulnerability associated with the bilateral trade link between
reporting country i and partner country j over a certain time-span. As in the case of the FDIP variable,
the source of the data is country i’s statistics. The basic data are the (annual) exports and imports of
country i relating to country j, as recorded by country i (in the currency of country i). We assume that
only exports are a source of vulnerability. Recording country i’s vulnerability is therefore calculated as
                                                          
15 There is also some evidence that the FDI-output comovement relationship may be nonlinear. Regression
equations that feature the square root of FDIP generally perform somewhat better than specifications in which
FDIP enters linearly, especially for the more recent periods which are characterized by higher FDI exposures.
Results are available upon request.
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vulnerability is calculated as country i’s imports from j, expressed as a percentage of country j’s GDP.
We take the simple average of these two as our annual observation of the exposure associated with
bilateral trade link.
16 Finally, TRADE(i,j) is the average of the annual observations over the time-span
under consideration.
Table 4 presents the results. We find that, in general, the estimates of γ are statistically significant from
zero for all measures of output comovement and both estimation methods. Hence, more intensive
foreign trade relations go hand in hand with more synchronized business cycles.
17 Judged by both the
estimates and the t-statistics, international trade linkages had their weakest effects in the 1980s. During
the years 1990–1994 – when Germany ran current account deficits in the aftermath of reunification
and Japan adjusted to collapse of the stock market and real estate bubbles – trade linkages are strongly
linked to the correlation pattern of GDP growth rates. For the most recent subperiod 1995–2001 the
influence of trade ties, although significant in most cases, is more muted compared to that measured
over the whole sample period, especially for correlations based on annual data. Like for FDI, the
results are weakest for the coherence measure.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that FDI relations as well as trade relations are important
determinants of the degree of business cycle comovement. So the next natural step in the analysis is to
incude both linkages into the regression equation,
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 j i TRADE j i FDIP D D D D D j i γ β α α α α α α ρ + + + + + + + = (3)
If multicollinearity is a problem the estimates of both β and γ will be insignificant. In this case we can
conclude that economic relationships do matter for business cycle comovement, but we cannot
statistically distinguish between the contribution of international trade and that of FDI.
Table 5 presents the results of eq. (3). For the years 1982–2001 the OLS-results indicate that bilateral
trade ties are mostly significant while bilateral FDI ties are not, although the t-statistic is always
greater than one. However, this finding is not robust with respect to the estimation method. In
particular, correlations of real GDP growth rates are found to be closer related to FDI relations than
trade relations. In addition, for three of the four other comovement measures the coefficient estimates
                                                          
16 Due to data limitations, data refer to exports and imports of goods only. We use purchasing power parity
exchange rates to convert partner country GDPs into reporting country currencies. Assigning both trade
measures the same weight is supported by the data. When we included both measures in eq. (2) as separate
explanatory variables, the hypothesis of equal slope coefficients could not be rejected at the usual significance
levels.
17 A similar result was reported by Frankel and Rose (1998) and De Haan, Inklaar and Sleijpen (2002).
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 401
October 2004for both linkages are not significantly differently from zero, while their  t-statistics are similar in
magnitude. This is an indication that multicollinearity between trade and FDI relationships is
significantly affecting the estimation problem. Consequently, there is strong and robust evidence for a
link between bilateral economic relationships and bilateral business cycle correlations. However, it is
difficult to disentangle the effects of FDI relations and those of foreign trade relations.
The results for the various subperiods suggest, however, that a remarkable change has occurred over
the past 20 years. According to both estimation methods, bilateral FDI relations are far more closely
linked to bilateral output comovement patterns than trade relations in the most recent period 1995–
2001. This holds in particular for correlations of real GDP growth rates, but the same pattern emerges
for the output gap and the other comovement measures. By contrast, the years 1990–1994 appear to
have been characterized by a more dominant influence of foreign trade relations. For the early years of
the sample (1982–89) the picture is mixed. In most cases the estimates of both β and γ are
insignificant, implying that it is difficult to disentangle the roles of trade and FDI as transmission
channels of disturbances. For the output gap correlations we find a significant effect of FDI relations,
but not of trade relations when estimating by OLS. We get a similar pattern using WLS for
correlations of real GDP growth rates.
6. Lagged spillovers
The discussion so far has concentrated on cross-country variations in contemporaneous correlations.
This offers an incomplete picture as international spillovers may occur with some lags as well. For this
reason, we next analyze the link between FDI exposures and the extent to which economies are
affected with a lag by developments in other countries. Our measure of the lagged spillover is based
on the concept of Granger causality. For each country pair (i,j) – 66 in total – we first estimate the
following regression equation for various time-spans

==





l l l t j y l t i y t i y
11
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( λ γ α (4)
where  y denotes the quarterly growth rate of real GDP or the output gap, and m stands for the
maximum lag with which y(j) affects y(i).
18 Granger causality from y(j) to y(i) obtains if some of the
λl’s are nonzero. In that case, conditions in partner country j influence those in reporting country i with
a lag. We take the sum of the coefficients λl as our measure of the lagged spillover from country j to
country i. Preliminary tests indicate that the maximum lag length m in eq. (4) for most country pairs
                                                          
18 Note that there is no double-counting issue in the case of lagged spillovers.
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lagged spillover measures derived from eq. (4) with m set to either 1 or 2. The left-hand side variable
is now the lagged spillover measure. As the focus is now on the vulnerability to lagged spillovers from
partner countries, the bilateral FDI position is expressed as a percentage of reporting country GDP.
Tables 6 reports the estimation results of suitably modified versions of eqs. (1)–(2). We find that a
country’s vulnerability to past disturbances in partner economies is positively related to the size of its
bilateral FDI exposure. This holds for both the full sample period and the period 1995–2001. The
relevance of FDI linkages for the cross-country pattern of lagged output spillovers is more apparent
for the output gap, as indicated by the generally larger t-statistics. Once again, the period of German
reunification emerges as an atypical episode. For foreign trade relations we mostly find weaker effects
than for FDI linkages, notably in the case of lagged spillovers of real GDP growth rates. This contrasts
with our findings about contemporaneous comovement patterns, where FDI linkages mattered most in
the most recent period only.
Table 7 presents the empirical results for the case in which both FDI and trade relations enter the
regression equation. These findings show that FDI patterns dominate the explanation of cross-country
lagged spillover patterns, both for the complete sample and all subperiods. In all cases, the estimated
coefficient of the bilateral trade position is insignificant and often wrongly signed. This particular
result suggests that the FDI channel of transmission may be working for a longer time than the
international trade channel. In case of a shock in a certain country, the trade channel quickly transmits
the shock to the other economies, but then shuts down. The presence of an FDI channel implies that
this shock may affect the other economies not only contemporaneously, but also in the next two
quarters.
7. Summary and conclusions
This paper examines to what extent the rapid expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the
internationalization of production can be related to the phenomenon of more synchronized business
cycles. Both larger inward and outward investment positions may make the domestic economy more
susceptible to economic disturbances abroad.
We focus on the relationship between bilateral FDI positions and cross-country business cycle
patterns. Do countries that have comparatively intensive FDI ties also exhibit a relatively large degree
of business cycle comovement? We analyze the experience in the years 1982–2001 of Canada, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, looking at the bilateral linkages of these six countries
among themselves and with six other countries (Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Sweden and
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investigate the ability of international trade patterns to explain business cycle linkages.
Taking into account both FDI relations and foreign trade relations, we conclude that before 1995 there
is no strong evidence in favor of an independent role of FDI in explaining cross-country business cycle
patterns. Although the degree of output comovement tends to be higher for economies that have
relatively intensive investment relations, we find the same to be true for international trade relations.
We thus find strong and robust evidence for a link between bilateral economic relationships and
bilateral business cycle correlations, but multicollinearity problems prevent a precise assessment of the
respective contributions of trade and FDI. Trade patterns tend to explain the pattern of output
comovement better than FDI linkages in the years immediately following German reunification and
the collapse of the Japanese asset market bubble (1990–1994). The strong growth of FDI since 1995
appears to have changed this picture. FDI linkages are much better able to explain the pattern of
international business cycle linkages than foreign trade relations in the years 1995–2001. Regarding
the vulnerability to foreign output spillovers that occur with a lag, we find that FDI exposures are
relevant, but international trade relations are not. In contrast to the case of contemporaneous linkages,
this result is also obtained for the complete sample, not just the most recent period.
The empirical results of this paper are supportive evidence for the view that apart from the foreign
trade channel, FDI now constitutes a separate channel through which economies may affect each other
in an economically significant fashion. Moreover, foreign disturbances may influence the domestic
economy for a longer time-span when relayed through the FDI channel than through the trade channel,
which mainly operates contemporaneously.
Our research has two policy implications. The first one is that the trend towards greater economic
interdependence through FDI implies an underlying tendency for business cycles to display a more
synchronized behavior than in the past. This is not to say that we will actually observe greater output
comovement in the future all the time, however. As the experience of the 1990s teaches, the effects of
large asymmetric shocks may overshadow the upward influence on account of increasing
interdependence.
The second lesson for policy makers is that FDI appears to have become an important channel for the
international transmission of disturbances. This aspect of global linkages should be incorporated into
the macroeconomic models that are used for making forecasts, evaluating scenarios and conducting
policy analyses by national policy makers and international organizations, such as the IMF and the
OECD. Up until now, international trade and financial asset prices serve as the main linkages among
individual economies in these models. Finding out how the FDI channel exactly operates constitutes
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domestic labor market conditions (wages and/or employment) are partly determined by the
profitability of firms abroad (Jansen and Stokman 2003). International rent sharing may thus be an
important aspect of global economic linkages at the macro-level. Adding a variable measuring foreign
profitability to the specification of wage or employment equations could be a useful first step towards
the incorporation of the FDI channel into (large-scale) econometric models.
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for all possible pairs among the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada.
Before averaging across the 21 country pairs, correlations were smoothed using a symmetric rolling 40-quarter
window, using a Gaussian kernel.
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Canada France Germany N'lands UK US Canada France Germany N'lands UK US
Australia 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.7 1.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.4 1.7
Belgium 0.4 9.5 2.2 5.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 15.5 33.1 18.7 1.4 5.6
Canada 0.5 0.9 0.2 2.9 9.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 3.2 9.4
France 1.7 6.1 4.4 4.4 3.6 9.9 7.2 5.2 16.7 10.8
Germany 2.9 13.5 7.7 2.4 8.0 2.4 11.4 13.8 8.9 10.3
Italy 0.0 4.3 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 4.0 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.5
Japan 2.5 0.5 5.8 2.6 2.2 10.5 2.6 1.9 1.8 3.5 3.6 13.5
Netherlands 2.2 17.1 12.7 18.0 20.1 4.7 19.2 19.7 14.1 12.1
Sweden 0.4 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.3 0.8 2.3 1.7 2.5 1.3 1.8
Switzerland 1.7 10.3 14.0 11.2 6.3 5.7 2.0 7.9 4.9 4.8 3.1 5.7
UK 9.6 13.7 8.9 14.1 23.6 7.3 13.7 7.1 15.7 17.6
US 75.1 23.1 37.6 34.3 51.2 63.2 15.0 17.5 21.6 34.4
Total (% of GDP) 18.6 5.6 4.6 15.1 12.1 4.4 28.4 19.5 23.8 64.6 30.9 12.4
Australia 2.1 0.5 1.3 0.7 9.6 3.8 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.3 2.7
Belgium 0.2 11.9 9.2 7.0 1.7 2.5 1.0 13.8 7.7 12.1 9.9 3.5
Canada 2.0 3.8 3.3 6.8 20.4 7.0 1.1 1.8 1.7 10.0
France 0.3 8.3 5.6 2.9 3.3 1.3 5.0 6.1 3.6 3.0
Germany 1.1 8.9 9.3 4.2 7.3 1.1 5.6 10.5 3.9 3.9
Italy 0.3 4.2 3.8 1.4 0.9 2.6 0.9 3.2 3.4 1.8 0.6 1.7
Japan 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.0 4.0 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.4 0.8 4.6
Netherlands 0.9 7.0 6.1 5.2 3.1 2.3 9.0 13.2 30.4 9.1
Sweden 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.4 0.8 3.2 1.8
Switzerland 1.0 16.3 7.4 5.6 1.3 6.8 1.5 4.0 3.1 4.9 1.1 4.3
UK 7.7 6.5 4.9 5.8 14.3 10.4 12.7 10.4 10.7 18.7
US 69.2 24.2 29.7 41.3 35.2 48.3 25.4 28.0 25.7 23.5
Total (% of GDP) 11.8 4.6 6.6 29.6 21.7 5.5 32.0 32.8 24.9 79.8 63.3 13.2
Correlation in-out 1.00 0.82 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.47 0.98 0.71 0.57 0.91 0.68 0.75
  same, excl US 0.90 0.69 0.44 0.67 0.32 0.51 0.78 0.68 0.95 0.52
Sources: OECD (2002), Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), Statistics Canada (2002), Sparling (2002), Banque de France (2002), 
UK National Statistics (2002), Borga and Yorgason (2002) and Borga and Mataloni (2001). 
1985 2000
Inward foreign direct investment position (% of total)
Outward foreign direct investment position (% of total)
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October 2004Table 2. The role of foreign affiliates in host economies
share in host
country man.
employment of all 
for. affiliates (%)
1989 1999 1989 1999 1998 1989 1999
Australia 4.9 4.7 18.7 10.8 26.3 43.6
Belgium 5.6 5.1
Canada 9.5 10.0 14.5 14.4 65.6 69.5
France 2.3 2.6 12.0 15.0 27.8 19.1 17.3
Germany 3.0 2.9 9.3 12.0 7.2 32.4 24.2
Ireland 12.4 16.8 36.8
Italy 1.9 2.0 12.7 15.0 14.0 15.0 13.3
Japan 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.8 50.5 40.5
Netherlands 5.8 4.5 21.4 17.7 21.9 27.1 25.4
Sweden 1.2 2.6 12.2 19.6 26.8 9.9 13.2
Switzerland 2.9 3.3 12.3 10.3 23.6 32.0
UK 6.2 7.0 14.7 14.9 27.3 42.1 47.0
US 4.1 5.6 13.4
Sources: columns 1 and 2: Borga and Yorgason (2002); US data: Zeile (2002); columns 3 and 4: own calculations; 
column 5: UNCTAD (2002) and OECD (2002); columns 6 and 7: UNCTAD (2002).
estimated US share in host
p.m.
of US affliates (%) of all foreign affiliates (%)
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October 2004Table 3. Pooled cross-section regression of output comovement on FDI positions 
p-value p-value p-value p-value
estimate test test estimate test test
beta t(beta) a(i)=a b(i)=b beta t(beta) a(i)=a b(i)=b
1982-2001 0.014 2.83 0.321 0.165 0.020 4.01 0.135 0.331
1982-1989 0.018 2.10 0.367 0.393 0.023 2.62 0.257 0.356
1990-1994 0.025 2.32 0.664 0.504 0.030 2.78 0.393 0.486
1995-2001 0.019 5.36 0.088 0.612 0.023 6.30 0.011 0.721
1982-2001 0.021 2.93 0.331 0.328 0.022 2.97 0.224 0.428
1982-1989 0.026 2.44 0.028 0.503 0.018 1.66 0.007 0.394
1990-1994 0.027 2.08 0.242 0.651 0.027 2.17 0.046 0.887
1995-2001 0.016 2.71 0.125 0.476 0.025 3.83 0.150 0.657
1982-2001 0.448 2.97 0.225 0.843 0.361 2.01 0.373 0.847
1982-1989 0.083 0.43 0.942 0.286 0.063 0.28 0.932 0.047
1990-1994 1.319 2.48 0.274 0.842 0.874 1.49 0.359 0.658
1995-2001 0.325 1.85 0.054 0.998 0.365 1.70 0.086 0.990
1982-2001 0.023 3.10 0.184 0.367 0.024 3.12 0.159 0.475
1982-1989 0.021 2.06 0.000 0.594 0.017 1.69 0.000 0.407
1990-1994 0.048 2.64 0.245 0.727 0.043 2.30 0.078 0.783
1995-2001 0.017 3.06 0.102 0.982 0.020 3.23 0.158 0.907
1982-2001 0.024 2.79 0.226 0.643 0.022 2.36 0.205 0.494
1982-1989 0.025 3.04 0.120 0.921 0.019 2.05 0.183 0.910
1990-1994 0.021 2.34 0.181 0.759 0.020 2.20 0.111 0.871
1995-2001 0.021 2.81 0.416 0.979 0.027 2.92 0.539 0.967
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
OLS-estimates WLS-estimates
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
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p-value p-value p-value p-value
estimate test test estimate test test
beta t(beta) a(i)=a b(i)=b beta t(beta) a(i)=a b(i)=b
1982-2001 0.030 3.65 0.182 0.068 0.033 3.26 0.209 0.327
1982-1989 0.027 2.18 0.359 0.176 0.024 1.78 0.302 0.743
1990-1994 0.061 3.90 0.623 0.124 0.055 3.12 0.756 0.223
1995-2001 0.027 3.04 0.433 0.670 0.046 3.92 0.183 0.382
1982-2001 0.043 3.46 0.397 0.068 0.043 3.01 0.338 0.258
1982-1989 0.021 1.33 0.011 0.477 0.015 0.88 0.007 0.811
1990-1994 0.068 3.59 0.269 0.325 0.053 2.62 0.128 0.811
1995-2001 0.032 2.46 0.381 0.289 0.062 3.38 0.523 0.121
1982-2001 0.839 3.21 0.143 0.423 0.961 2.84 0.187 0.584
1982-1989 0.174 0.63 0.954 0.952 0.091 0.27 0.937 0.997
1990-1994 2.580 3.18 0.366 0.164 2.466 2.62 0.446 0.325
1995-2001 0.384 0.95 0.054 0.962 0.806 1.34 0.072 0.810
1982-2001 0.044 3.35 0.157 0.110 0.044 3.02 0.150 0.353
1982-1989 0.034 2.36 0.000 0.475 0.026 1.74 0.000 0.557
1990-1994 0.095 3.48 0.365 0.276 0.083 2.71 0.196 0.665
1995-2001 0.022 1.68 0.316 0.828 0.039 2.18 0.398 0.672
1982-2001 0.043 2.88 0.197 0.199 0.044 2.46 0.196 0.441
1982-1989 0.020 1.64 0.172 0.485 0.012 0.82 0.321 0.531
1990-1994 0.044 3.17 0.106 0.267 0.039 2.60 0.083 0.689
1995-2001 0.021 1.19 0.763 0.575 0.052 1.99 0.808 0.398
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
OLS-estimates WLS-estimates
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
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October 2004Table 5. Pooled cross-section regression of output comovement on FDI positions 
               and foreign trade flows
beta beta beta beta
FDI t(beta) Trade t(beta) FDI t(beta) Trade t(beta)
1982-2001 0.006 1.13 0.024 2.44 0.015 2.47 0.015 1.23
1982-1989 0.012 1.23 0.019 1.36 0.020 2.02 0.011 0.77
1990-1994 0.006 0.49 0.056 3.02 0.016 1.29 0.039 1.85
1995-2001 0.017 4.17 0.007 0.80 0.021 4.46 0.010 0.80
1982-2001 0.011 1.33 0.032 2.18 0.014 1.47 0.028 1.54
1982-1989 0.025 2.01 0.005 0.27 0.017 1.40 0.004 0.19
1990-1994 0.005 0.36 0.064 2.82 0.013 0.88 0.041 1.66
1995-2001 0.011 1.68 0.019 1.27 0.018 2.17 0.032 1.41
1982-2001 0.265 1.50 0.585 1.89 0.099 0.45 0.845 1.98
1982-1989 0.034 0.15 0.151 0.48 0.045 0.18 0.062 0.16
1990-1994 0.621 1.02 2.062 2.15 0.048 0.07 2.420 2.10
1995-2001 0.324 1.56 0.008 0.02 0.299 1.09 0.297 0.39
1982-2001 0.014 1.57 0.030 1.98 0.015 1.63 0.027 1.46
1982-1989 0.013 1.11 0.026 1.57 0.012 1.04 0.019 1.11
1990-1994 0.022 1.06 0.077 2.38 0.022 0.98 0.063 1.68
1995-2001 0.016 2.49 0.003 0.22 0.018 2.31 0.008 0.37
1982-2001 0.015 1.47 0.029 1.63 0.013 1.12 0.029 1.29
1982-1989 0.024 2.51 0.005 0.34 0.019 1.85 -0.001 -0.05
1990-1994 0.009 0.87 0.036 2.21 0.010 0.92 0.029 1.62
1995-2001 0.022 2.51 -0.004 -0.22 0.024 2.08 0.011 0.33
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(c) business cycle indicator (coherence)
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
OLS-estimates WLS-estimates
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(b) quarterly output gap (HP filter)
(e) annual output gap (HP filter)
(d) annual growth rate of real GDP
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
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               or foreign trade flows
beta t(beta) beta t(beta) beta t(beta) beta t(beta)
1982-2001 0.0135 2.60 0.0171 3.02 0.0113 1.51 0.0159 1.93
1982-1989 0.0208 2.35 0.0306 3.10 0.0109 0.86 0.0255 1.78
1990-1994 0.0126 1.18 0.0102 0.64 0.0116 0.80 0.0083 0.38
1995-2001 0.0110 2.47 0.0130 2.08 0.0097 1.48 0.0087 0.94
1982-2001 0.0144 4.58 0.0090 3.53 0.0171 3.71 0.0076 2.02
1982-1989 0.0212 3.16 0.0149 2.57 0.0210 2.18 0.0142 1.71
1990-1994 0.0132 1.76 0.0057 0.73 0.0070 0.68 -0.0056 -0.53
1995-2001 0.0115 3.14 0.0080 2.08 0.0131 2.42 0.0063 1.11
Foreign direct investment Foreign trade
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(b) output gap (HP filter)
over 1 quarter over 2 quarters over 1 quarter over 2 quarters
Table 7. Pooled cross-section regression of lagged output spillovers on FDI positions 
              and foreign trade flows
beta beta beta beta
FDI t(beta) Trade t(beta) FDI t(beta) Trade t(beta)
1982-2001 0.015 2.07 -0.003 -0.26 0.017 2.24 -0.001 -0.05
1982-1989 0.026 2.28 -0.011 -0.70 0.031 2.45 -0.001 -0.05
1990-1994 0.012 0.86 0.000 0.01 0.011 0.51 -0.002 -0.06
1995-2001 0.012 1.94 -0.002 -0.21 0.017 1.93 -0.007 -0.61
1982-2001 0.011 2.65 0.006 1.07 0.010 2.79 -0.002 -0.32
1982-1989 0.019 2.23 0.005 0.41 0.014 1.87 0.002 0.23
1990-1994 0.018 1.73 -0.009 -0.65 0.015 1.47 -0.019 -1.38
1995-2001 0.012 1.90 0.001 0.14 0.009 1.78 -0.003 -0.38
1 lag 2 lags
(a) quarterly growth rate of real GDP
(b) output gap (HP filter)
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